Starting April 2, the Trump administration has pledged that nations all around the world will pay new reciprocal tariffs from the United States. President Donald Trump and other administration officials have regularly said something along the lines of, “Whatever they charge us, we’ll charge them.”
Their discourse presents the United States as having for many years enforced especially low tariffs on foreign goods. Earlier this month, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told Fox Business Network that “it’s absolutely accurate” to state that America boasts the lowest tariffs among nations.
Experts on world trade have great reservations about the government’s intention to apply broad tariffs on nations in response to tariffs on goods from the United States as well as the rhetoric in support of such a move. Their worries include that the Trump government might not have as much trade negotiating clout as it believes and that the tariff rates and nontariff obstacles of the United States actually have not been at rock-bottom levels compared with all other nations. Other concerns are that government officials are acting too fast on a difficult problem and that tariffs will not bring back U.S. manufacturing to the hoped-for degree.
Economists and trade experts identify four major obstacles that will complicate Trump’s tariff proposal here.
- There isn’t any “great gulf” separating US from others. Jennifer Hillman, a Georgetown University law professor specializing on trade who worked as chief counsel for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative during the Clinton administration, says Trump is exaggerating how unjust or uneven the present system of tariffs is. “If you simply look at it, the trade-weighted average tariff of the United States is 2.2%,” she remarked. “There are many nations below the United States here. She said, “even China’s trade-weighted average tariff is only 3%,” so it is incorrect to claim that the U.S. and important trading partners have a “big gulf.” Her comments were made at a recent Washington International Trade Association function. Based on 2023 World Trade Organization data, nations with a trade-weighted average tariff below the U.S. level include Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, Peru and Singapore. Hillman informed MarketWatch that she believes a trade-weighted average tariff, considering the volume of trade, presents a more accurate picture than a basic average of the degree of protection a certain market may have. Furthermore among the critics claiming Trump and his allies are cherry-picking statistics on tariffs—that example, by stressing how the European Union has a greater duty on American cars than the United States puts on vehicles from the E.U.—are Georgetown experts. They point out that the U.S. treats imported trucks and sport-utility vehicles under a higher duty than the E.U. does, which is not addressed. Originally known as “the chicken tax,” this 25% obligation has been in force for 60 years and is well-known for having helped make SUVs and trucks increasingly significant to American automakers. “We have our own high tariffs, but those are washed out” in average tariff rates thanks to “a bunch of zeros,” meaning no charges, said Scott Lincicome, a vice president focused on economics and trade at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. “We exhibit our own dairy protectionism. Trucks are subject to a 25% tariff. Lincicome told MarketWatch: “We have 40% tariffs on footwear.” Many American imports, meanwhile, notably metal items, a variety of food products, and consumer electronics, enjoyed a 0% duty before Trump’s second term. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, half of all industrial items arriving into the country duty free. Lincicome further underlined that although developing nations have to rely more on tariffs since they lack the money for subsidies or the administrative ability for other trade measures, the United States has nontariff barriers and subsidies that limit trade. “We have all these other tools, thus we do not need tariffs for protection of income,” he stated. A White House official informed MarketWatch that the government is not exaggerating and cited the BofA Global Research map below showing the U.S. has the lowest amount of tariffs and nontariff trade obstacles among the Group of 20 countries. Lincicome, however, attacked BofA’s accounting of America’s nontariff obstacles as far from thorough, pointing out that it excludes things like antidumping and countervailing measures, large subsidies for local businesses and “Buy American” initiatives. “No wonder they came up with such a small number for the United States,” the Cato analyst remarked.
- Trump has what degree of leverage? Simon Evenett, a professor of geopolitics and strategy at the IMD Business School in Switzerland, claims that while Canada and Mexico mostly rely on the U.S. market, the Trump White House is exaggerating the degree of its influence on its other trading partners. According to Evenett, one should consider the rate at which exports of a nation are reaching possible third markets. “If everything were lost, China could replace all of its lost export sales to the United States, if everything were lost, in under three years,” Evenett remarked during the recent WITA event. “At the current rate of export growth,” “There’s 70 countries who could replace all of their lost export sales to the United States in less than 12 months – Australia is one of them – and so when you factor these types of real-world considerations in… the subset of countries that you have actually excellent leverage over is probably much smaller than many people in Washington realize.” Stated differently, should Australia, which predominantly exports items generated from its vast natural resources, be cut off from the U.S. market, the income lost in one year may be made up for by its rising exports to other countries, mostly Asian ones. According to a study by Evenett, who also founded a charity running a website called Global Trade Alert, the U.S. share of world imports has dropped from 19.6% in 2000 to roughly 13.5%. More than 100 nations might fully recover from closure of the U.S. market by 2030, the report’s chart below reveals. Although totally losing access to the American market is a worst-case scenario, the research advises considering that possible scenario as it is a useful exercise. Hillman of Georgetown concurs that American leverage is declining. Over the past decade, regionalization has grown; trading within Asia or Europe, for example, has caused many nations to rely less on the U.S. market than they once did, she added. One study estimates that the U.S. consumed in 2023 15% of China’s exports, down from 21% in 2000. Although the U.S. has some influence over trading partners, Trump is inflating the degree of it, Hillman remarked. She said that although losing the American market would be “very painful period” for other nations, it would also be detrimental for the United States, which would suffer with retaliatory actions. She told MarketWatch, “these nations are ready to take retaliatory action against the United States since they have enough confidence in their own economies and in their ability to diversify their economy.”
- To encourage reshoring, what should tariffs be set at? Trump and other administration officials frequently underline that the main objective of the new U.S. tariffs is to encourage American production of vehicles, metal products and other items and therefore expand the number of factory jobs. The government has preferred levies of 25% ahead of the April 2 reciprocal tariffs when it has pushed out additional taxes like on some Canadian and Mexican imports and all imported steel and aluminum. Thus, it is simple to see that with reciprocal tariffs the 25% level might once more be utilized. Still, would that cause manufacturing to migrate back? One financial analyst claims that a 25% tariff is insufficient to render corporate supply chains unsustainable and that the Trump administration would actually have to impose import taxes of maybe 100% to 200%, along with provide large government subsidies, to force businesses to reshore their manufacturing. Cato’s Lincicome said it depended on the product and that 25% taxes might result in greater local manufacture in the vehicle industry, as has happened for trucks and SUVs. For a huge deal of lower-value manufacturing, he said, 25% tariffs wouldn’t change the needle. “For things like textiles and apparel, no chance,” he declared. Hillman said U.S. businesses may continue importing some components needed for sophisticated goods even with a 25% tariff. Under these circumstances, it can take time to find a substitute, hence the businesses would pay the charge and maybe raise their prices. However, the situation differs depending on the commodity; some situations show that a 25% tax is sufficient to increase U.S. production or only cut usage of a certain item.
- Is the Trump crew acting too fast? Lincicome cautioned the Trump team against acting with its reciprocal tariffs too quickly. He said it may take years to investigate a broad spectrum of products and develop reciprocal obligations addressing the tariff and nontariff barriers created by the U.S. and every trade partner. “It would lead to an amazing amount of complexity, but if you want an accurate number, that’s what you need to do,” he advised. “Or you can just fake it and do it really quickly; it’s increasingly evident that the Trump administration is leaning toward the latter approach.”